Cota 1061

By AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE
Published: 26 Nov 21:43 EST (02:43 GMT)
Defense News

RIO DE JANEIRO - Brazil revealed that it had bought 12 attack helicopters from Russia on October 23, after a visit here by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on Nov. 26.

The deal, which had not previously been announced, appeared in a memorandum of understanding signed by the Russian leader and Brazilian President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva.

“The parties recognize as a promissory accord … some activities outlined during the celebration of the supply of the 12 Mi-35M helicopters for the Brazilian Air Force,” part of the text read.

Brazil and Russia “declare their conviction of the mutual benefits that can come from the continuation of the cooperation started with the negotiations relative to the fleet of attack helicopters.”

The Brazilian government confirmed the purchase in a joint statement released after Medvedev’s departure.

Medvedev signed accords to deepen military cooperation with Lula in Brazil earlier, but they did not close concrete agreements.

After the meeting the Russian president traveled to Venezuela - which has adopted Cuba’s role as the leading anti-American voice in the region - as Russian and Venezuelan warships conduct joint military maneuvers.

05 November 2008

Air Force Technology

Parts of Brazil’s military oppose a government proposal to overhaul the country’s defence strategy and tighten rules on arms purchases, the plan’s author said on Tuesday.

Brazil was expected to unveil a blueprint two months ago that would outline a shift in defence priorities from its southern borders to its porous Amazon frontier, new offshore oil deposits and vast air space.

But criticism and a perceived lack of support caused the plan’s release to be delayed.

“We received a compendium of criticisms and suggestions - to be frank - many of them are proposing to dilute the national defence act because it is a very strong proposal,” Roberto Mangabeira Unger, minister for strategic affairs and co-author of the plan, said in an interview.

International defence contractors have been closely watching Brazil, which is expected to spend billions of dollars over the next decade to refurbish its military.

Unger did not name any of the critics but suggested they included military leaders and cabinet members.

The plan’s proposal to convert the entire army into a rapid deployment strike force to allow it to respond more quickly to security threats drew much flak, said Unger, a former Harvard University law professor.

“It’s too ambitious, too expensive, too difficult to realise - technically or culturally; we don’t need it because we’re not threatened by anybody,” said Unger, listing the criticisms he had heard.

One problem in designing the plan was that Brazil lacked civilian defence experts to advise the government, he added.

France eyed

The proposed plan wants arms purchases to meet strict defence needs rather than to project power abroad as in past decades.

Military resistance to such proposals has diminished but still lingers, Unger said.

“Nobody wants to be transformed. When the civilian leadership proposes to shake them up, they close ranks, they close the gates,” he said.

President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva has instructed Unger to get more advice and support for the plan. In the third week of November it will be reviewed by the National Defense Council, made up of congressional leaders, the commanders of the three armed forces as well as other cabinet members.

Unger is hopeful it will remain largely intact.

“I don’t believe that the cumulative effect of these suggestions will be to weaken the national defence plan.”

The plan also calls for Brazil to develop its own defence industry through tax incentives and public procurement.

France is best-suited to become Brazil’s preferred defence supplier because of the transfer of technology it has offered, Unger said.

“With France we’re very advanced,” he said, adding that the United States has long been reluctant to transfer defence technology.

Russia, another country Brazil is seeking closer military ties with, has no tradition of large-scale technology transfer, Unger said.

Brazil’s air force said last month it chose US-based Boeing Co, France’s Dassault and Saab of Sweden as finalists in a tender for 36 fighter jets as part of a fleet renewal.

By Raymond Colitt, Reuters

13-Oct-2008 13:54 EDT

Defense Industry Daily

Mercopress reports that Chile is looking to replace its 16 upgraded F-5E/F+ Tiger II aircraft with more second-hand F-16s. The F-5+ are slated for decommissioning in 2009, and Chile’s existing F-16 fleet currently includes 10 advanced F-16C/D Block 50/52 aircraft, and another 18 F-16A/B Mid-Life Upgrade aircraft bought from the Netherlands for $180 million. Mercopress places Chile’s next buy at $170 million for 16 more F-16A/B MLU fighters from The Netherlands, to be delivered in 2009.

Chilean military equipment purchases are somewhat unusual, in that they are financed by a set percentage of windfall earnings from copper mining, one of Chile’s major exports. That legislation dates back to Chile’s military dictatorship, and is scheduled to be amended, but the fund created by that arrangement is expected to hit $3 billion in the coming months.

This is so despite a slew of purchases that are modernizing Chile’s armed forces, after a long slump in copper prices that had put a crimp in Chile’s options. The last decade has seen purchases of F-16s, handfuls of Bell 412 and Eurocopter AS535 Super Puma helicopters, a strong core of used Leopard tanks and accompanying Marder IFVs for the Army, plus 2 new Scorpene Class submarines, 8 used frigates, and 3 new C-295 MP maritime patrol aircraft for use along Chile’s long naval frontier. If the reports of a new F-16 order turn out to be correct, Chile will have ended up replacing its 16-24 recently-retired Mirage 50CN Panteras and 16 F-5+ with 44 F-16s.

Sep 25th 2008 | SANTIAGO
From The Economist print edition

A newly streamlined army polishes its democratic credentials. The bad memories are fading

AFP

TEN years after General Augusto Pinochet stepped down as commander-in-chief, Chile’s army is at last emerging from the shadow of its murky past. For a quarter of a century it laboured under the baleful influence of the man who came to power in a military coup in 1973, its once proud reputation sullied by the blood of thousands of innocents tortured and murdered under his 17-year dictatorship. The army was unable to start reforming itself until he finally stepped down as its leader another eight years later.

Despite hundreds of court cases (though few convictions so far), many questions about the army’s role in the human-rights abuses remain unanswered. The remains of some 3,000 people killed or “disappeared” by the regime have never been found. Many Chileans still wonder how such a highly disciplined force could have resorted to such appalling violence. “There is a weight of history,” admits José Goñi, Chile’s defence minister. “But the new generation doesn’t have to be held responsible.” Only six of those in the army at the time of the 1973 coup remain in service.

General Óscar Izurieta, the army’s commander, says that the army will not be accepted fully as part of democratic society until questions over its past can finally be laid to rest. The courts have to do their job, he agrees, and it is legitimate for people who suffered at the army’s hands to want to keep the issue open. “But I don’t know if it’s good for them or the country,” he says. “Every day, they put me face to face with a problem of the past.”

The army has tried hard to regain legitimacy over the past decade. It has seized on natural disasters, such as earthquakes, to play an active civil-defence role. It has used its field hospitals to take medical services to remote areas and help the national health service cut waiting lists. And it has sought to reduce its social isolation by such measures as sending cadets from the Santiago military academy to one of the city’s universities for some of their courses.

Some of the excess fat has been shed, too. Currently 40,000-strong, down from around 70,000 in the mid-1990s under Pinochet’s command, it is leaner and more professional. Unpaid military service has been scaled down and, unlike General Pinochet’s conscript-packed army, all national-service places are now filled by volunteers. And under a law passed by Congress this summer their number will drop even further as they are gradually replaced by professional soldiers.

Thanks to record prices for copper, Chile’s main export, and an odd arrangement (predating Mr Pinochet) under which Codelco, the state copper producer, transfers 10% of its export revenues (amounting to $1.4 billion last year) to the armed forces for capital expenditure, there has been money to spend. The finance ministry has the last word, but the army has been able to shop extensively, with acquisitions including German tanks and better electronics. Today, Chile’s is the most modern and best-equipped army in Latin America, says Armen Kouyoumdjian, an adviser to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

But what exactly does the country need such an army for? In the 1970s Chile faced a real threat of war with Argentina and Peru, but relations with both have improved a lot since then. Indeed, Chile’s military ties with Argentina are so close that the two countries have created a joint standby unit for international operations. Although political instability in Bolivia is a worry, the main risk to Chile from that direction—an exodus of Bolivian refugees—is hardly a military problem. On the other hand, having a strong army may help to ensure that relations with Peru stay peaceful. Chile and Peru have had a long-standing dispute over maritime borders, and Ollanta Humala, the Peruvian populist who almost won his country’s most recent presidential election, found it convenient to stir up sentiment against Chile.

For its part, the army emphasises that it is available for international peacekeeping. It is already part of the United Nations force in Haiti—its first significant peacekeeping role. Some Chileans reckon that the army is still bigger than necessary for a peaceful country of only 16m people. But a rational plan for slimming should be based on the needs of the future, not the misdeeds of the past.

September 18th, 2008
Word Count: 2800

Council on Hemispheric Affairs

In recent years President Hugo Chávez has become Washington’s ultimate Latin American nemesis, with the Venezuelan leader striving to bedevil the U.S. at every possible opportunity. While his rhetoric and flamboyant attitude might otherwise go unnoticed, Venezuela is an oil rich country and Chávez has used his “petro-dollars” to upgrade his nation’s military, mostly through the purchase of Russian-weaponry, and has implemented a foreign policy that is breathtaking in its sweep and novelty.

The latest confrontation between the two adversaries took place on September 11, 2008, when President Chávez expelled the U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela, Patrick Duddy, in solidarity with Bolivia’s leader, Evo Morales, who had taken the same action shortly before. Nerves were further stressed among Washington officials when, as part of upcoming military exercises in the Caribbean, two supersonic Russian bombers landed in Venezuela to take part in scheduled maneuvers.

Due to the continuing rhetorical salvos being exchanged between Washington and Caracas, the Venezuelan military finds itself in an awkward position. Its unique position in the middle of the Chávez-Washington feud, denies it the possibility of a professional relationship with the U.S. Such a relationship, previously one of its most important, would provide it with military hardware, training, and invitations to Pentagon-sponsored ministerial gatherings, as well as attendance at the Fort Benning former School of the Americas, now known as the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC).

The Venezuela-Russia Relationship
For more than 5 years, President Chávez has been seeking the modernization of the Venezuelan Armed Forces (FAN). The military budget was increased by 46.04 percent from 2004 to 2006, positioning Venezuela atop the list of countries with the largest military investment in the region during that period. The Venezuelan armed forces have increased to nearly 129,150 members. The rearmament of the FAN can be seen as an evident move towards the reconstruction of the military potential of a country facing a threat from what the Venezuelan head of State calls the Asymmetrical War. Another part of Chávez’s strategy was the creation of a military reserve and a territorial guard in 2005, with an addition to the second section of the Organic Law of the Armed Forces (Ley Orgánica de las Fuerzas Armadas –LOFAN), clause which also increased the purchase of light weaponry, handing out approximately 2 million guns for street-to-street resistance in case the country came under attack.

The Caracas-Moscow relationship made international headlines in 2006 when Venezuela agreed to purchase military equipment for a total of approximately $3 billion from Russia (2.2 billion euros). Through this purchase, Venezuela acquired 24 Su-30MK2 multi-purpose fighters, 100,000 AK-103 rifles and more than 50 helicopters of various models. Chávez has been quoted by the Russian news agency Itar-Tass as saying that only a strong military “can stop the imperia [the United States], which threatens our democracy.”

In addition, the management of Russia’s Izhevsk Manufacturing plant has reported that it will build two factories in Venezuela to manufacture Kalashnikov rifle-type AK-103s and the corresponding ammunition. An August 15, 2007 United Press International article maintains that “the AK-47, like the old U.S. Army Jeep and the Lockheed Martin C-130 Hercules transport aircraft, exemplifies a weapons system design that never grows old because it is virtually impossible to improve upon it”. The goal is to have both plants completed by 2010.

Russia, the Arms Supplier
During Chávez’s June 2007 trip to Moscow, the Venezuelan president ordered the purchase of five Russian submarines to increase the interception capacity of the Venezuelan Navy. According to the Russian news agency Interfax, Venezuela ordered five Varshavyanka-class submarines, also known as Kilo 636. Interfax explained that “the subs are powered with diesel fuel and equipped with six torpedo tubes, 18 torpedoes, 24 mines and eight surface-to-air missiles.”

Incoming reports estimate the purchase totaled anywhere from $1-3 billion. A July 9 2007 article by RusData Dialine-BizEkon News argued that the $3 billion sum is “closer to the mark because Russia will also have to build a submarine maintenance base in Venezuela, supply weapons and components, and train crews.” The article praised the Kilo’s power, describing it as a “silent killer” and explaining how it possesses “up-to-date Club-S cruise missiles which have a range of 7,500 nautical miles.” The report explained that “the single-screw Kilo-class submarines are among the most silent in the world because the screw rotates more slowly; and all of their equipment have special noise-reduction systems.”

While the most important pillar of the Russo-Venezuelan relationship is perhaps its military component, Moscow is attempting to bring both nations closer through other means as well. For example, Russian Vice Prime Minister Igor Sechin visited Venezuela and met with Chávez on September 16. Among the issues discussed, according to the Russian news agency Kommersant, was the possibility of partnerships between Russian oil companies (i.e. Gazprom, Lukoil) and Venezuela’s state-owned Petroleos de Venezuela SA. (PDVSA) Sechin, board chairman of state-controlled Rosneft, which is Russia’s largest oil company, declared during his trip that “it would be strange for Russia, which shares first place in global oil production with the Saudis, not to interact, say, with Venezuela, which holds fifth or sixth place.”

In July, Chávez declared that “if Russian armed forces would like to come to Venezuela, they will be welcomed warmly […] we will raise flags, beat drums and sing songs, because our allies will come.” Two months later, on Wednesday September 10, two Russian Tupolev Tu-160 bombers landed at Venezuela’s airfield “Libertador,” as part of the joint military war games that Caracas and Moscow have been holding in the last year. The Blackjacks, as NATO code-named for the long-range bombers, were expected to fly home on September 15, once the training mission is over. The bombers were escorted on their 13-hour flight to South America by a U.S. F-16 NATO fighter over Iceland, and over Norway, by two F-16s from the Norwegian Air Force, according to the Russian Air Force spokesman, Commander Vladimir Drik. The latter also mentioned that NATO has been monitoring Russian strategic bomber patrol flights. A Tupolev Tu-160 is capable of carrying 12 cruise missile Kh-55MS, code-named as AS-15 Kent. In another configuration is capable of carrying a 200kt nuclear warhead. The Russian Air Force Commander specified that the two bombers assigned to land in Venezuela were not carrying nuclear weapons at the time.

Geopolitics 2008
President Chávez is hoping to counter the United States influence in South America, by working to strengthen military ties with the prompt circumstance upon the arrival of the Russian bombers in Venezuela. On August 31, the Venezuelan leader acclaimed the rise of Russia as a super power, a status which has been pointedly underestimated for several years by the U.S. He stated that “Yankee hegemony is finished.” It is evident that the events that were scheduled to take place in the northern region of South America are part of a provocative new geopolitical game, in which old enemies –the U.S. and Russia– are showing off their war gear, but with a new Latin American participant churning the waters between the historical foes.

Enemy where?
As its arms’ purchases, it becomes important to analyze whether, Venezuela faces any external bona fide security threats, or if the Chávez government is becoming a growing threat for the stability of the region. To begin, without counting the Caribbean and Central American states, Venezuela borders three countries while extremely unlikely that any of the following scenarios would ever come to pass, the use of speculative war games can be a valuable and informative exercise.

Guyana
A small country led by a tough leader, Bharrat Jagdeo, Guyana traditionally keeps to itself and mostly focuses its foreign relations on its CARICOM English-speaking neighbors. If anything, Guyana has more domestic problems than any interest to pose a security threat to Venezuela. The former British colony is still celebrating the death of notorious gang-leader Rondell “Fineman” Rawlins. Rawlins was killed in a shootout in late August. He was regarded as Guyana’s most wanted fugitive since he went on the run in 2003; because he has been linked to 78 murders dating back to 2006, he had been tirelessly pursued.

Venezuela had a small run-in with Guyana in 2007. According to the handful of details that are publicly known, (provided by Georgetown) during that November, a contingent of 36 Venezuelan armed military personnel, led by an unidentified general, “entered into Guyana’s territory” and proceeded to use military-type explosive devices to destroy two gold-mining dredges that allegedly were poaching on disputed Guyanese territory. According to the Guyanese side, the attack took place near Iguana Island on the Cuyuní River. It was never made clear whether the actions carried out by the Venezuelan unit were part of an initiative based on the discretion of the general in charge of the unit, or if the order rose through the chain-of-command up to Chávez.

The history of the Venezuelan-Guyanese territorial dispute can be traced back to the 1900s, when Guyana was known as British Guiana and ruled by the United Kingdom. Caracas claims, pressed for implementation of sovereignty over two thirds of Guyana’s total land mass of 83,000 square miles, mainly in the sprawling timber and mineral-rich Essequibo region. In spite of the November 2007 incident, an all-out war between the two countries remains unthinkable, particularly as Guyana cannot realistically stand up against Venezuela without the fear of a major defeat. For his part, Chávez would not attack first as he does not want his country to be seen as the aggressor over a decidedly weaker state, but one with strong regional connections.

Brazil, the Latin American Giant
Venezuela and Brazil, due to geographic realities, would find it exceedingly difficult to enter into a conflict with each other. Their common border is in the heart of the Amazon jungle, making major logistical operations as well as the use of armor, all but impossible. In any extremely unlikely game plan, should a war break out, it would be characterized mostly by infantry-led guerrilla-style stealth operations featuring ambushes and artillery and aerial maneuvers, as needed. Quite literally, both navies would need to pass three countries, Guyana, Suriname and French Guyana (or France) just to reach each other’s territories.

Aside from both striving to become South America’s newest military powerhouse, the countries are unlikely to engage in a confrontation, at least in this generation. Underscoring this point, both have carried out joint military exercises which can be interpreted as confidence-building measures. As recently as August 2008, Brazil and Venezuela executed Operation VENBRA 5, involving 260 soldiers from the FAB and 140 from the Venezuelan Air Force (ANV). This VENBRA operation featured joint training and simulation exercises to improve cooperation between both air forces in order to have the capacity to combat illicit aircraft flights. The exercises took place in the Venezuelan Bolivar and Brazilian Roraima border regions. In addition, the Venezuelan and Brazilian leaders joined together to set up the South American Defense Council, bringing the two countries closer in security and defense matters.

Colombia
Realistically, Colombia is the one regional country with which Venezuela could conceivably engage in an armed confrontation on a practical basis and with a reasonable expectation of victory on both sides. With the strong ties that President Álvaro Uribe has with the White House and the likely superiority in terms of the depth of experience and integration of technology by the Colombian armed forces makes Venezuela no easy match for Colombia. Nevertheless, the two countries came perilously close to military confrontation during the recent Ecuadorian crisis, when the Colombian Armed Forces bombed a secret FARC camp just within the Ecuadorian border. Chávez sent some of his tanks to Venezuela’s border with Colombia, as a sign of solidarity with his ally, Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa. These events resulted in major disclosures that came from several captured laptop computers, which fell into the hands of Colombian intelligence officers causing heightened tensions between the two countries. Accusations of ties between the Chávez’ administration and the leftist FARC brought on the worst diplomatic crisis involving the two countries in the last ten years, abruptly affecting Venezuela’s food marketplace and causing exchanges between Uribe and Chávez. In February, Chávez declared that, “lamentably in Colombia the oligarchy governs [..] it’s possible that the Colombian government could lend itself to a military action against Venezuela.” Despite the threatening signs, both leaders met on July 11 of this year in Paraguaná, Venezuela to put an end to the crisis. However, it is unknown how long this diplomatic peace arrangement between two such volatile figures will hold.

When Venezuela announced that it would carry out joint military exercises with Russia in the Caribbean, Colombia’s reaction was predictable as well as immediate. On September 10, former Colombian Minister of Defense, Marta Lucía Ramírez, alleged that the joint military maneuvers between Russia and Venezuela could put at risk the region’s stability stating that, “Tensions between the U.S. and Russia are being relocated to Andean and Caribbean scenarios.” Her statement was based on Chávez’s strong reaction upon learning of the possibility of the installation of a U.S.-Colombian military base. The Venezuelan leader threatened to launch a strong military reaction if this option became a reality. The former government official added that her country should exhort the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) to take immediate action on this matter.

Nevertheless, any form of conflict between Colombia and Venezuela seems all but impossible, due to the profound symbiotic relationship, which is both strategic and commercial, in which the two countries are involved. Among other factors, trade is a key link tying the two states together. Neither government can afford putting a multi-billion dollar trade partnership at risk. In addition, from a strictly security point of view, for decades Colombia has fought a domestic insurgency in the form of the FARC, ELN and the drug cartels. Most of its troops have been used for domestic operations, more than for protecting the country from external threats. If there were a war, Venezuela would have to be the instigator, but this would go against Chávez’ Bolivarian dreams of regional unity, and the fact that the regional organizations in which Venezuela is involved would hardly sanction it.

The overall feeling is that South America is certainly en-route to a new arms race, as not only Venezuela, but also countries like Brazil and Chile are stepping up their arms purchases. The current security situation in the region will be one of the first tests for UNASUR and its recently created security agency, the Southern Defense Council (CSD), to see if they can control the situation and prevent unnecessary and potentially dangerous escalations from occurring.

Reality and Self-Perception, Chávez style
Hugo Chávez has almost made it a hobby to look for ways to embitter his country’s relationship with Washington, as well as that of any country that he perceives as allied to the U.S. or that differs from Venezuela in political ideology and points of view.

Chávez’s profound animosity for the current U.S. administration plays a key rule in the nature of the U.S.-Venezuela relationship. For starters, Chávez strives to end Washington’s interventions in the affairs of other countries through the application of either hard or soft power. In addition, Chávez’s pseudo-Marxist ideology, leftist rhetoric and his goal of a “21st Century Socialism” clashes with the U.S.’s highly conventional core belief in orthodox capitalism and its historical actions that make it play the role of the private sector’s chief apostle. Anti-Washington feelings were intensified by allegations that Washington supported the April 2002 coup against Chávez, removing him from office for approximately 48 hours. The fact that he managed to return to power, with the backing of most of the country’s population (as well as with the support of the country’s major military officers), gave Chávez the probably mistaken feeling that the citizens would support him irrespective of the path that he would lead them down.

On a number of occasions, Chávez has labeled U.S. President George W. Bush as “the devil” and lately addressed an audience of supporters where he referred to the U.S. administration as “Yankees de mierda,” in a speech that was being broadcast nationwide. This approach raised eyebrows and left no room for the application of protocol or the use of civility that a major political figure like Chávez would be expected to have.

The unfolding of Venezuela-Russian relations is an issue that will need to be more closely examined. It might be exceedingly unwise for Chávez to begin regarding Russia as a trustworthy ally. Venezuela has gone to great lengths to establish close ties with the Russian government, not only through military purchases involving billions of dollars, but also with diplomatic initiatives like recognizing the Georgian breakaway enclaves of South Ossetia. In the upcoming weeks, Chávez is scheduled to visit Russia once again, making this his sixth visit to that country, the second during this year. However, it remains to be seen how far Moscow will go in investing resources and efforts to protect its new beachhead in South America.

This analysis was prepared by COHA Research Associate Raylsiyaly Rivero and COHA Research Fellow Alex Sánchez

Some 25 groups submitted bids for the deal, and the tender was won by the French aerospace and defense group, according to La Tercera.

Received Friday, 25 July 2008 20:00:00 GMT

The Tocqueville Connection

SANTIAGO, July 25, 2008 (AFP) - Chile has decided to buy a satellite for military and scientific purposes from France’s EADS-Astrium group, the newspaper La Tercera reported Friday.

Chile’s Defense Ministry wants the 72-million-dollar satellite to monitor the country’s borders and to help with natural disasters.

Some 25 groups submitted bids for the deal, and the tender was won by the French aerospace and defense group, according to La Tercera.

The satellite is slated to be rocketed into orbit in 2010.

Posted On: Jun 20 2008 8:04AM
By Army Spc. Thaddeus Harrington

29th MPAD, Maryland Army National Guard

US Southern Command

CAMP BULLIS, Texas – Fuerzas Comando 2008, a special operations forces competition, commenced June 19 with 17 countries participating here through June 25.

Fuerzas Comando will test the participants’ physical and psychological endurance through many obstacles both on land and in water. The inception of the competition was in 2004 with 13 nations from the Western Hemisphere. Each nation’s team is comprised of elite special operations soldiers.

“The Fuerzas Comando competition is about building the brotherhood of the Special Operation Forces within the hemisphere and giving them a chance to demonstrate their capabilities in a friendly atmosphere,” said U.S. Army Lt. Col. Carlos Blanchard, chief of the Training Readiness and Exercise Division, Special Operations Command South.

Blanchard, a Miami native, has been involved with the competition for two years. This year is his first as commander of the entire event.

Many of the participants have traveled, worked with and fought aside one another in the deserts and jungles. Each team will compete in 11 different events ranging from weapons qualifications, obstacle courses, water events, to a road march and a combined assault.

The multi-national panel is comprised of judges who have each experienced every event prior to the competition. This experience allows the judges to assess the physical and psychological efforts every competitor puts forth.

The 17 participating teams are from the nations of: Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United States, and Uruguay with two countries observing. As observers Barbados and Mexico are gathering information to assist them in building a team for possible future Fuerzas Comando competitions. Many nations start out observing the competition, then return home to organize a team to compete the following year.

There are 22 countries in the distinguished visitors program. This program allows ministerial politicians and general officers who are commanding counter-terrorism forces an exchange of experiences through seminars to build and foster relationships.

“It’s an opportunity to see the results of our efforts in our foreign internal defense programs, our relationship building programs and see the level of skills that all the nations in the hemisphere have been evolving thanks to our special operations forces soldiers,” said Blanchard.

Posted On: Jun 26 2008 2:39PM
Story by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class (SW/AW) Michael E. Miller Jr.

USS Boxer (LHD4) Public Affairs.

US Southern Command

ABOARD USS BOXER, San Diego – USS Boxer (LHD 4), along with various embarked units, returned to San Diego June 26, concluding nearly two months at sea in support of the Pacific phase of the humanitarian mission, Continuing Promise 2008.

During the mission, Boxer operated in Guatemala, El Salvador and Peru. The Continuing Promise medical contingent provided more than 65,000 patient encounters to 24,000 patients, including medical or veterinarian care and education. The assistance included dispensing nearly 40,000 prescriptions, treating more than 2,800 animals in addition to teaching 123 classes in preventative medicine and industrial hygiene.

The Humanitarian Civic Assistance (HCA) mission provided partner nations in the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) area of focus a mobile, flexible and rapidly responsive medical and engineering capability for a number of missions and training opportunities in Central and South America.

“I couldn’t be happier with the success of this mission,” said Capt. Peter K. Dallman, the mission commander for the Pacific phase of Continuing Promise 2008. “Everyone did great across the board and we far surpassed anyone’s expectations of the overall success of this mission.”

While anchored off the coasts of the three countries, 127 patients were flown to Boxer for shipboard surgeries. Surgeries included cyst and gallbladder removal, hernia repair and eye surgery (cataract excision).

“Providing access to medical information and treatment supports common medical needs in the region,” said the Continuing Promise Medical Contingent Commander, Capt. (Dr.) Louis Orosz. “The team of medical professionals this mission has brought together is top-notch. Their work here will last generations and leave a lasting impression of the great things the United States can do.”

Seabees from Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit (CBMU) 303 and Navy Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB) 5, embarked aboard Boxer, renovated eight schools and a church across the three countries in addition to road and drainage repair.

Renovation work included roofing, installing new windows and installing new ceiling fans. The Seabees also repaired the sewage systems and provided running water to most of the facilities.

“In the Seabee community, we always say we ‘Can Do’,” said Lt. Micah Kiletico, the officer-in-charge of the CBMU 303 detachment aboard Boxer. “But the group of Seabees I’ve worked with on Continuing Promise 2008 have gone above and beyond, giving 200 percent effort. They went the extra mile to ensure they made a big difference in the lives of the citizens of Central and South America.”

The Pacific Phase of Continuing Promise is one of two HCA deployments planned for the SOUTHCOM area of focus for 2008. The second Continuing Promise deployment will be conducted by USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) in the Caribbean. The deployment to the region is part of the Partnership of the Americas initiative. The training, clinical and engineering capability this mission brought to the region demonstrates U.S. commitment to fostering cooperative partnerships.

“It really has been an honor to visit the Navy ship that has been making a positive impact that we can see already in our country,” said El Salvador President, Elias Antonio Saca during a press conference in El Salvador. “We appreciate all the humanitarian support the United States, the Navy, the Captain and the entire crew of this important ship has brought. We profoundly appreciate your support for our inhabitants.”

For many service members embarked aboard Boxer for Continuing Promise, it was their first humanitarian mission. Continuing Promise offered them a unique opportunity to see the impact their skill sets can have in a humanitarian civic assistance role.

“I hope the people we worked with know there are people back in the United States who really care for them,” said Utilitiesman 1st Class (SCW) James Kocsis. “Supporting this mission has been the greatest honor I’ve had in my entire Navy career.”

Continuing Promise exemplifies the U.S. maritime strategy, which emphasizes deploying forces to build confidence and trust among nations through collective maritime security efforts that focus on common threats and mutual interests.

Wasp-class amphibious assault ships like Boxer are designed with a variety of expeditionary mission capabilities, including rapid, projected humanitarian assistance worldwide. They also have the physical capacity to transport large amounts of medical and engineering supplies and equipment to most locations around the globe. The same flexibility and configuration that makes Boxer an effective warship also makes it an extraordinarily effective ship for performing humanitarian assistance missions.

Embarked units and organizations aboard Boxer for Continuing Promise included Amphibious Squadron 5, Fleet Surgical Team 5, U.S. Public Health Service, Project HOPE, Project Handclasp, Navy Seabee Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit 303, Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 14, Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 764, Tactical Air Control Squadron 11, Special Marine Air Ground Task Force 24, Helicopter Sea Combat Support Squadron 23, Assault Craft Unit 1, Fleet Survey Team, Maritime Civil Affairs Team 205 and Beach Master Unit 1.

Written on June 26, 2008 – 3:04 pm | by FIDSNS |

Frontier India, Defense & Strategic News

The Defence Public Sector Undertaking, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has secured an order for supply of 7 Dhruv Advanced Light Helicopters to Ecuadorian Air Force. HAL has bagged this order amidst strong competition from M/s. Elbit, M/s. Eurocopter and M/s. Kazan. HAL’s offer of $ 50.7 million for 7 helicopters was about 32% lower than the second lowest bid from M/s. Elbit.

The first helicopter would be delivered by HAL in 6 month’s time. The contract for the supply of helicopters is likely to be signed within a few weeks. This order signifies Ecuador’s confidence in Indian technology and can lead the way for further collaboration. This contract, which will establish HAL internationally, has been extremely significant and hard fought.

HAL has already supplied 76 helicopters to the defence services with excellent serviceability records. The company is presently executing orders for 159 more helicopters for Army and Air Force.